Justo wrote:gill1109 wrote:“
You can call it counterfactual if you like. So what? It is what it is. The maths are legal, and we are working within a mathematical model. If you get conclusions (about relations between correlations observed in different experiments) that do not hold in reality then you know the model does not describe reality.
So nothing, you are saying just what I said: you can do any legal mathematical operation. For instance, if you add and subtract A(a,\lamda), does it mean that you really have to measure A(a,\lambda)? If we cannot do legal mathematical operations with an expression that has some physical meaning, mathematics would be useless for physics. That is exactly what many Bell deniers do.
Of course, we have to start with a mathematical expression that does have a physical meaning. In this case in the integral giving the value of P(a,b).
Exactly. I was agreeing with you, Justo.
I have been looking at the Wikipedia page on counterfactual definiteness and the long sequence of papers by Henry Stapp and Abner Shimony on Henry Stapp's introduction of the term "counterfactual definiteness" and his later attempt to weaken the concept and/or drop the term, and to replace it by something weaker but without losing the conclusion of Bell's theorem. The more I think about it, the more I think that "counterfactual definiteness" is an unfortunate pair of words. The assumption is not supposed to entail that outcomes of unperformed measurements *are* real, but only that what can imagine them to be real, in the sense that one can put down mathematical models in which they exist mathematically - which is not to say that they exist in reality.
I would suggest that anyone who finds the term unsatisfactory should simply not use it. Personally, I like to use it, because Boris Tsirelson liked it, and because I very much respect that guy. He was a mathematician and I am a mathematician. We both mean by counterfactual definiteness the possibility to find a mathematical model in which those outcomes of all possible experiments do exist alongside of the experiment actually chosen. The assumption becomes meaningful when complemented with assumptions of locality and of no-conspiracy; because locality applies to those counterfactual outcomes as well. They are localized to the same place where the factual outcomes reside.
The basis is mathematics. Leave philosophy to the philosophers.
By the way, suppose we agree that counterfactual definiteness plus locality should mean the mathematical existence of the pair of functions ((A(a): a in {possible Alice's settings}), (B(b): b in {possible Bob's settings})) = (A(.),B(.)). Then you could define lambda = the pair of functions (A(.),B(.)). Finally define A(a, lambda) = first component of (A(.),B(.)) [which is a function defined on the set of possible settings] evaluated at a. We see that locality plus counterfactual definiteness is *equivalent* to local hidden variables is *equivalent* to local realism.
If we stick to mathematics things are very clear.
If we move to philosophy we will never be finished.