MaxTegmark Asks, What is an Observer?
Here are some edited excerpts from Tegmark's paper
viewable at:
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1401.1219v3.pdf
A commonly held view is that consciousness is irrelevant
to physics and should therefore not be discussed
in physics papers. One oft-stated reason is a perceived
lack of rigor in past attempts to link consciousness to
physics. Another argument is that physics has been managed
just fine for hundreds of years by avoiding this subject,
and should therefore keep doing so. Yet the fact
that most physics problems can be solved without reference
to consciousness does not guarantee that this applies
to all physics problems.
. . . attempt. . .
to rigorously define what constitutes an observer.
What is the solution to the
quantum measurement problem? This again hinges crucially
on the role of observation: does the wavefunction
undergo a non-unitary collapse when an observation is
made, are there Everettian parallel universes, or does it
make no sense to talk about an an observer-independent
reality, as argued by QBism advocates
Is our persistent
failure to unify general relativity with quantum
mechanics linked to the different roles of observers in the
two theories? After all, the idealized observer in general
relativity has no mass, no spatial extent and no effect
on what is observed, whereas the quantum observer notoriously
does appear to affect the quantum state of the
observed system.
This “quantum
factorization problem" appears intimately related to
the nature of an observer.
The only issue there is consensus on is that there is
no consensus about how to define an observer and its
role. One might hope that a detailed observer definition
will prove unnecessary because some simple properties
such as the ability to record information might suffice;
however, we will see that at least two more properties of
observers may be necessary to solve the quantum factorization
problem, and that a closer examination of consciousness
may be required to identify these properties.
Another commonly held view is that consciousness is
unrelated to quantum mechanics because the brain is a
wet, warm system where decoherence destroys quantum
superpositions of neuron firing much faster than we can
think, preventing our brain from acting as a quantum
computer [4]. In this paper, I argue that consciousness
and quantum mechanics are nonetheless related, but in
a different way: it is not so much that quantum mechanics
is relevant to the brain, as the other way around.
Specifically, consciousness is relevant to solving an open
problem at the very heart of quantum mechanics: the
quantum factorization problem.
Why are you conscious right now? Specifically, why
are you having a subjective experience of reading these
words, seeing colors and hearing sounds, while the inanimate objects around you are presumably not having any
subjective experience at all? Different people mean different
things by \consciousness", including awareness of
environment or self. I am asking the more basic question
of why you experience anything at all, which is the
essence of what philosopher David Chalmers has termed
\the hard problem" of consciousness and which has preoccupied
philosophers throughout the ages (see [5] and
references therein). A traditional answer to this problem
is dualism | that living entities differ from inanimate
ones because they contain some non-physical element
such as an anima" or soul". Support for dualism
among scientists has gradually dwindled with the realization
that we are made of quarks and electrons, which
as far as we can tell move according to simple physical
laws. If your particles really move according to the laws
of physics, then your purported soul is having no effect on
your particles, so your conscious mind and its ability to
control your movements would have nothing to do with a
soul. If your particles were instead found not to obey the
known laws of physics because they were being pushed
around by your soul, then we could treat the soul as just
another physical entity able to exert forces on particles,
and study what physical laws it obeys, just as physicists
have studied new forces fields and particles in the past.
The key assumption in this paper is that consciousness
is a property of certain physical systems, with no \secret
sauce" or non-physical elements.1, This transforms
Chalmers' hard problem. Instead of starting with the
hard problem of why an arrangement of particles can
feel conscious, we will start with the hard fact that some
arrangement of particles (such as your brain) do feel conscious
while others (such as your pillow) do not, and ask
what properties of the particle arrangement make the
difference.
This paper is not a comprehensive theory of consciousness.
Rather, it is an investigation into the physical
properties that conscious systems must have.
Here are some of my thoughts:
While Tegmark is apparently formulating a proto-theory that
consciousness arises from physical substance,
it seems to me that he is unintentionally going in the
opposite direction.
My inexpert view is that consciousness is at least as fundamental as are
quarks, space and energy. In other words, materialist physics does not
explain consciousness, rather, consciousness gives rise to
much of physical phenomena.
I am not a physicist, but I have presented my view in detail here
and elsewhere.
Comments are solicited.
.
viewable at:
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1401.1219v3.pdf
A commonly held view is that consciousness is irrelevant
to physics and should therefore not be discussed
in physics papers. One oft-stated reason is a perceived
lack of rigor in past attempts to link consciousness to
physics. Another argument is that physics has been managed
just fine for hundreds of years by avoiding this subject,
and should therefore keep doing so. Yet the fact
that most physics problems can be solved without reference
to consciousness does not guarantee that this applies
to all physics problems.
. . . attempt. . .
to rigorously define what constitutes an observer.
What is the solution to the
quantum measurement problem? This again hinges crucially
on the role of observation: does the wavefunction
undergo a non-unitary collapse when an observation is
made, are there Everettian parallel universes, or does it
make no sense to talk about an an observer-independent
reality, as argued by QBism advocates
Is our persistent
failure to unify general relativity with quantum
mechanics linked to the different roles of observers in the
two theories? After all, the idealized observer in general
relativity has no mass, no spatial extent and no effect
on what is observed, whereas the quantum observer notoriously
does appear to affect the quantum state of the
observed system.
This “quantum
factorization problem" appears intimately related to
the nature of an observer.
The only issue there is consensus on is that there is
no consensus about how to define an observer and its
role. One might hope that a detailed observer definition
will prove unnecessary because some simple properties
such as the ability to record information might suffice;
however, we will see that at least two more properties of
observers may be necessary to solve the quantum factorization
problem, and that a closer examination of consciousness
may be required to identify these properties.
Another commonly held view is that consciousness is
unrelated to quantum mechanics because the brain is a
wet, warm system where decoherence destroys quantum
superpositions of neuron firing much faster than we can
think, preventing our brain from acting as a quantum
computer [4]. In this paper, I argue that consciousness
and quantum mechanics are nonetheless related, but in
a different way: it is not so much that quantum mechanics
is relevant to the brain, as the other way around.
Specifically, consciousness is relevant to solving an open
problem at the very heart of quantum mechanics: the
quantum factorization problem.
Why are you conscious right now? Specifically, why
are you having a subjective experience of reading these
words, seeing colors and hearing sounds, while the inanimate objects around you are presumably not having any
subjective experience at all? Different people mean different
things by \consciousness", including awareness of
environment or self. I am asking the more basic question
of why you experience anything at all, which is the
essence of what philosopher David Chalmers has termed
\the hard problem" of consciousness and which has preoccupied
philosophers throughout the ages (see [5] and
references therein). A traditional answer to this problem
is dualism | that living entities differ from inanimate
ones because they contain some non-physical element
such as an anima" or soul". Support for dualism
among scientists has gradually dwindled with the realization
that we are made of quarks and electrons, which
as far as we can tell move according to simple physical
laws. If your particles really move according to the laws
of physics, then your purported soul is having no effect on
your particles, so your conscious mind and its ability to
control your movements would have nothing to do with a
soul. If your particles were instead found not to obey the
known laws of physics because they were being pushed
around by your soul, then we could treat the soul as just
another physical entity able to exert forces on particles,
and study what physical laws it obeys, just as physicists
have studied new forces fields and particles in the past.
The key assumption in this paper is that consciousness
is a property of certain physical systems, with no \secret
sauce" or non-physical elements.1, This transforms
Chalmers' hard problem. Instead of starting with the
hard problem of why an arrangement of particles can
feel conscious, we will start with the hard fact that some
arrangement of particles (such as your brain) do feel conscious
while others (such as your pillow) do not, and ask
what properties of the particle arrangement make the
difference.
This paper is not a comprehensive theory of consciousness.
Rather, it is an investigation into the physical
properties that conscious systems must have.
Here are some of my thoughts:
While Tegmark is apparently formulating a proto-theory that
consciousness arises from physical substance,
it seems to me that he is unintentionally going in the
opposite direction.
My inexpert view is that consciousness is at least as fundamental as are
quarks, space and energy. In other words, materialist physics does not
explain consciousness, rather, consciousness gives rise to
much of physical phenomena.
I am not a physicist, but I have presented my view in detail here
and elsewhere.
Comments are solicited.
.