FrediFizzx wrote:http://www.sciphysicsforums.com/spfbb1/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=412&p=11544#p10488
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Thanks! And here’s the link directly to Jay’s pdf.
https://jayryablon.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/lrhvcqm-1.1.pdfJay seems to be saying: these things are local and real because they have observable consequences. The singlet correlations are for real (he says). QM predicts them. So the things which QM speak of are real. They do not commute. They are there whether or not we observe them. So they are local.
No disrespect intended, but I think this is a lawyer speaking, not a scientist. (I’m sure Jay is a great lawyer. He’s also an interesting scientist; I really like his work on the standard model, though I’m not qualified to evaluate it).
Jay says “this is not word games”. I say: these are typical word games. But let him submit his work to a philosophy of science journal. Those guys are the real experts on this kind of “word game”.
Copy-paste from Jay R. Yablon, October 31, 2019:
“We found leading to (2.5) that these j and –j cannot be observed because of the simultaneous measurement restrictions imposed by the uncertainty relation (2.4), given that a and b are known- by-definition. The orthodox ontological interpretation of the founders of Quantum Mechanics such as Bohr and Heisenberg held that if a physical object is blocked from observation by an uncertainty principle, then for at least that transient circumstance, it does not even exist as a physical reality. So, an orthodox interpretation would suggest that j and –j are not “reality.” But, it is the very fact that j and –j do have equal and opposite orientations which is responsible for the statistically-observed correlations (1.2). Put conversely: if j and –j did not have equal and opposite orientations, then we would not observe the strong correlations (1.2), but would observe something weaker. So, by an EPR “appeal to results of experiments and measurements,” although they are not directly observable, these j and –j do indeed have statistically-observable consequences, namely, the strong correlations themselves. And because of this, it seems necessary to regard j and –j as physical realities. But by so-doing, we must reject the orthodox view that an otherwise- real object which cannot not be measured due to an uncertainty principle thereby transiently loses its status as reality. Rather, we adopt the alternative view that the uncertainty principle – correctly interpreted – is a “reality hiding” principle, with these hidden realities nonetheless having observable consequences in the statistical outcomes of Quantum Mechanics.”
“Lest it be supposed that it is unwarranted to attribute reality to j and –j because such reality is inferred only by an empirical statistical result, it must be recognized that Bell’s Theorem itself does precisely the same thing: It starts with the statistical result that when we split large numbers of singlets and propagate their two particles into opposite directions to be detected by Alice and Bob, the correlation (1.2), which itself is statistically defined, is observed to be −a ⋅ b . Then, on the basis of this statistical-not-direct, but clearly-observed result, Bell categorically rules out theories which are simultaneously local and realistic and contain local hidden variables, while admitting instantaneous action at a distance. So if the statistically-observed −a⋅b correlation is suitable for asserting such a sweeping generalization about the natural world, it is certainly suitable for inferring that j and –j must be classified as “elements of reality,” even though they are only statistically, but not directly, observable. It is also important to be clear that j and –j are only accorded reality status because they have statistically-observable consequences. If they did not have observable consequences – either direct or statistical – premised on these j and –j being real, then we would be reverting from science to philosophy, and there would be insufficient scientific grounds to regard these as reality. In this way, we avoid the “slippery slope” of admitting any physical elements which one might fantasize about, into a scientific definition of reality. Additionally, this is not merely playing word games with the definition of reality to suit a desired end. This is admitting to reality only objects which stem from Hermitian operators, but which objects become hidden by uncertainty when two Hermitian operators multiplied together are non- commuting and so create a non-Hermitian operator which spawns an uncertainty relation, but which objects still have statistically-observable consequences.”
Notice he says “because if this, it seems necessary...”. It seems to me that that is a matter op opinion. It doesn’t seem necessary to me. The only necessity comes from a necessity, felt by some, to declare QM to be local, real, complete. Well, you can join that church, if you like. It doesn’t have any impact on reality, on physics, on experiments and data. It is just a comfort blanket. OK. We all have comfort blankets. That’s life.
